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Abstract
This paper addresses the matter of inequality in network formation games. We
employ a quantity that we are calling the Nash Inequality Ratio (NIR), defined
as the maximal ratio between the highest and lowest costs incurred to individual
agents in a Nash equilibrium strategy, to characterize the extent to which inequality
is possible in equilibrium. We give tight upper bounds on the NIR for the network
formation games of Fabrikant et al. (PODC ’03) and Ehsani et al. (SPAA ’11).
With respect to the relationship between equality and social efficiency, we show
that, contrary to common expectations, efficiency does not necessarily come at the
expense of increased inequality.
1 Introduction
Non-cooperative game theory uses the concept of equilibria to capture the idea that,
in a competitive world, rational agents will maneuver themselves to a fixed point from
which no further maneuvering will yield additional benefits (e.g., a lower cost). The
most ubiquitous equilibrium concept is the Nash equilibrium, which is satisfied when
no individual agent can achieve a lower cost by changing their strategy given that the
strategies of every other agent remain unchanged. In a Nash equilibrium there can exist
a disparity between the costs incurred by individual agents, with the “more fortunate”
agents subjected to lower costs than the “less fortunate” ones. In this manuscript,
we investigate the Nash Inequality Ratio (NIR), defined as the maximum value of the
ratio between the highest and lowest costs found within a single Nash equilibrium, to
determine the extent to which cost disparity can arise between pairs of agents in an
equilibrium outcome.
Recent years have witnessed widespread growing concerns over economic inequality
(see, for example, [Bow12, Sti12, Pik14]). Yet, within the the algorithmic game theory
community – a field of study sitting at the intersection of computer science, economics,
and game theory – inequality has received very little attention, as evidenced by the
nonexistence of a standard vernacular with which to discuss bounds of the sort captured
by the NIR. The NIR expresses, in a natural way, a fundamental property of a strategic
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scenario, akin to the well-known metrics used to characterize other qualities of equilibria
such as the Price of Anarchy (PoA) [KP99, KP09] and the Price of Stability (PoS)
[ADKET04].
In this manuscript we analyze inequality in network formation games. Network
formation games model the formation of network structures by and between a collection
of strategic, self-interested individuals or agents. In these games, connectivity is deemed
to be desirable though costly, and it is up to the agents to reconcile the gains they achieve
through additional connectivity (e.g., access to information, the ability to communicate
and coordinate, etc.) with the costs or resource limitations that limit the number of
links that they can afford to create.
We focus on two network formation games: the Undirected Connections (UC)
game of Fabrikant et al. [FLM+03] and the Undirected Bounded Budget Con-
nections (UBBC) game of Ehsani et al. [EFM+11]. In both games, there is a set
N = {1, . . . , n} of strategic agents. Each agent i ∈ N selects a linking strategy
si ⊆ N \ {i} that identifies a subset of other agents which they will build links to. The
joint strategy s = (s1, . . . , sn) induces an undirected network Gs = (N,Es) in which the
agents themselves are vertices and the edge set Es is the union of every agent’s linking
strategies. In both games, agents incur a usage cost that is defined for each i ∈ N to
be the sum of distances between i and every other j ∈ N \ {i} in Gs. The two games
differ in how the cost of building edges is accounted for: in the UC game, each agent i
incurs an additional construction cost, defined to be α times the number of edges that
i builds; and in the UBBC game, each agent i is endowed with an edge budget, ki > 0,
determining the maximum number of edges that i can build.
Our first results are presented in Section 3 where we establish tight upper bounds on
the NIR for these two network formation games. For the UC game, we establish bounds
parameterized on the cost of building links, α, which is assumed to be a constant. In
particular, when links are cheap (α < 1), we find that the NIR is at most 1+α < 2; and
when links are expensive (α ≥ 1), the NIR is asymptotically bounded (as the number
of agents n→∞) by max{2, (1 + α)/2}. Then, for the UBBC game, we prove that the
NIR is bounded by the constant 2. We show that this bound is asymptotically tight
for every positive budget allocation – including those that endow different budgets to
different agents.
With these results established, in Section 4 we examine the relationships between
efficiency and (in)equality. Here we focus on Nash equilibrium strategies that are also
efficient (i.e., minimize the social cost). In both games we find that this relationship is
largely dependent upon the availability of resources (edges). In particular, we find that
when resources are scarce (that is, when edges are expensive in the UC model and when
budgets are small in the UBBC model), the two games behave quite differently from each
other. In the scarce regime for the UBBC game, no efficient Nash equilibrium strategies
achieve cost equality, and some actually maximize the inequality ratio (achieving the
NIR upper bound established in Section 3). On the other hand, in the scarce regime for
the UC game, there are some efficient Nash equilibrium strategies with egalitarian costs
and others with maximal inequality. These results demonstrate that the relationship
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between equality, efficiency, and equilibrium is entirely model-specific and varies across
network formation games.
The research agenda initiated in this manuscript – using the Nash Inequality Ratio
to characterize the relationship between equality, efficiency, and equilibrium – opens an
avenue for future research that involves the bounding of these quantities in different
games. Further, we hope that this work stimulates interest in examining questions of
inequality and equilibrium more broadly.
Section 5 concludes with closing remarks and acknowledgements. Finally, to facilitate
the flow of the main ideas, tangential proofs are deferred to Appendix A.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we formally define the Nash Inequality Ratio (Section 2.1) and the
network formation games (Section 2.2) upon which the remainder of the paper is focused.
2.1 Nash Inequality Ratio
Studies of economic inequality have spawned a number of metrics that aim to quantify
the level of inequality in a given system – the most well-known being the Gini coeffi-
cient [Gin12] used to quantify the level of inequality in the distribution of utility (wealth)
across a population of individuals. The related topic of fairness has also received consid-
erable attention in the game theory literature, particularly with respect to mechanism
design [Var74, BT96, JM07] where the goal is to develop allocation mechanisms that
achieve various notions of equity among the parties involved. Roughgarden [Rou02] pro-
posed a metric quantifying unfairness in the context of non-cooperative routing games
as the maximum ratio between an agent’s cost (i.e., latency of a flow path) in a socially
optimal outcome and that of a Nash equilibrium outcome.
In this manuscript, we put forward the Nash Inequality Ratio (NIR) as a simple
metric that bounds, in a natural way, the extent that inequality between agents is
supported in Nash equilibrium outcomes.
Consider a game Γ involving a set N = {1, . . . , n} of players/agents where, for
each agent i ∈ N , Si specifies i’s strategy space. A joint strategy s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈
S1 × · · · × Sn = S yields an outcome, and each agent i incurs a cost ci(s) that is a
function of the joint strategy.
Given a joint strategy s, let µ = argmini∈N ci(s) denote an agent that incurs a
minimal cost, and χ = argmaxi∈N ci(s) denote an agent that incurs the highest cost.
The inequality ratio (IR) for the joint strategy s is defined as:
IR(s) =
cχ(s)
cµ(s)
=
maxi∈N ci(s)
minj∈N cj(s)
.
That is, the IR of a strategy s is the maximal cost ratio between any pair of agents.
Recall that a joint strategy s is a Nash equilibrium if, for every agent i ∈ N and
every s′i ∈ Si, we have
ci(si, s−i) ≤ ci(s′i, s−i),
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where s−i is shorthand for the joint strategy of every agent except i. In a Nash equi-
librium, no agent stands to lower their cost through a unilateral strategy update. Let
SNE ⊆ S denote the set of all Nash equilibrium. The Nash Inequality Ratio (NIR) is
defined to be the greatest IR among all Nash equilibrium strategies:
NIR(Γ) = max
s∈SNE
IR(s). (1)
Note that the NIR is kind of a “max-max” quantity, in that the NIR of a game is the
maximum inequality ratio among all Nash equilibrium strategies for that game, and each
inequality ratio itself is a maximal quantity with respect to a particular strategy.
Finally, by definition we have IR(s) ≥ 1 for every strategy s ∈ S. A strategy s is
called egalitarian if IR(s) = 1.
2.2 Network Formation Games
Network formation games model the creation of networks by rational and self-interested
agents strategically building edges between one another. In this section, we describe
the two specific network formation games upon which we base the inequality analysis
presented in this paper: the Undirected Connections game (Section 2.2.1) and the
Undirected Bounded Budget Connections game (Section 2.2.2). For a compre-
hensive introduction to network formation games the reader is referred to the surveys
by Jackson [Jac03, Jac08], Goyal [Goy07], and Tardos and Wexler [TW07].
Questions regarding inequality in network formation games have received very little
attention in the literature. To the best of our knowledge, the only paper that looks
explicitly at inequality in non-cooperative network formation games is by Goyal and
Joshi [GJ06], who analyze the effect of local splillovers in pairwise stable networks. The
authors found that agents with more connections and larger neighborhoods earn higher
utilities than those with fewer connections and smaller neighborhoods. The results
presented in [GJ06] show that inequality can arise in equilibrium outcomes, but the
authors do not go on to quantify the extent of the inequality.
2.2.1 The Undirected Connections Game
The Undirected Connections (UC) network formation game1 introduced by Fab-
rikant, Luthra, Maneva, Papadimitriou, and Shenker [FLM+03] was the first network
formation game to appear in the algorithmic game theory literature.2 In addition to
introducing the UC model and establishing some basic properties of efficient and Nash
equilibrium outcomes, Fabrikant et al. establish bounds on the Price of Anarchy, which
have subsequently been tightened (e.g., [AEED+14, DHMZ12, MS13, MMM13]).
The UC model, as defined by Fabrikant et al. [FLM+03], is specified by a set N =
{1, . . . , n} of strategic agents and a parameter α > 0, a constant, that determines the
1The name Undirected Connections game is our own choosing in order to reinforce the nature of
the game.
2We note that earlier work on network formation games appeared in the economics literature – cf.
[AM88, JW96, BG00].
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cost of building a single edge. The strategy space for an individual agent i ∈ N , denoted
Si, consists of all possible subsets of other agents that i can build a direct connection to;
i.e., Si ⊆ P(N \ {i}).3 A (pure) strategy for agent i, denoted si ∈ Si, is a specific subset
of other agents that i wishes to establish links with. A joint strategy s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn),
representing the strategy selections of every agent in N , induces an undirected network
Gs = (N,Es), wherein the agents themselves are present as vertices and the edge set is
defined to be Es = {{i, j} : j ∈ si}. Because an undirected edge {i, j} is present in Gs
if either j ∈ si or i ∈ sj, edge formation in the UC model is said to be unilateral.
Each agent i incurs a cost that is a function of both its own strategy, si, and the joint
strategy of every other agent, s−i. This cost for agent i consists of both a usage cost,
di(s), and a creation cost, bi(s). The usage cost is defined to be the sum of distances
between i and every other agent j; di(s) =
∑
j∈N ℓGs(i, j) where ℓGs(i, j) denotes the
length of the shortest path between nodes i and j in the graph Gs (or ∞ if no such path
exists).4 The creation cost is defined to be linear in the number of edges i contributes to
the network’s construction; specifically, bi(s) = α · |si| where |si| conveys the number of
edges that i builds in the network and α ≥ 0 is a constant, specified as a game parameter.
Hence, the cost to an agent i ∈ N given the joint strategy profile s = (si, s−i) is
ci(s) = bi(s) + di(s) = α|si|+
∑
j∈N
ℓGs(i, j). (2)
The social cost is defined as the sum of the agents’ individual costs;
C(s) =
∑
i∈N
ci(s). (3)
A strategy profile s ∈ S that minimizes (3) is called efficient.
Fabrikant et al. identify the topologies of efficient and Nash equilibrium strategies
for three different regimes of α, which we summarize in Proposition 1. These results will
play prominently in our analysis of the UC game.
Proposition 1 ([FLM+03]). Efficient and Nash equilibrium outcomes for the UC net-
work formation game are:
1. When α < 1, the complete graph is both efficient and the only Nash equilibrium.5
2. When 1 ≤ α < 2, the complete graph is efficient but the star is the only Nash
equilibrium.6
3. When 2 ≤ α, the star is efficient and a Nash equilibrium, although there are other
Nash equilibrium outcomes as well.
3We use the notation P(X) to denote the power set of a set X; i.e., the set of all subsets of X.
4We will sometimes use the shorthand ℓs(·, ·) in place of ℓGs (·, ·).
5A complete graph/network refers to a network in which every pair of nodes are directly linked to
each other.
6 A star refers to a minimally connected network in which there is one central node that is directly
linked to the remaining n− 1 nodes. In a center-sponsored star, the cost of all n− 1 edges is borne by
the center node. In a peripheral-sponsored star, each of the n − 1 peripheral agents bares the cost of
building the edge connecting them to the center node.
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2.2.2 The Undirected Bounded Budget Connections Game
The Undirected Bounded Budget Connections (UBBC) network formation game
was introduced by Ehsani, Fazli, Mehrabian, Sadeghabad, Safari, Saghafian, and Shokat-
Fadaee [EFM+11] as an undirected variant of the Bounded Budget Connections
(BBC) game of Laoutaris et al. [LPR+08]. Ehsani et al. establish upper bounds on the
Price of Anarchy for the UBBC game, building upon the techniques developed by Alon
et al. [ADHL10] for a related network formation game.
As with the UC game, the UBBC game involves a set N = {1, . . . , n} of strategic
agents building edges between one another. However, in the UBBC model, each agent
i ∈ N is endowed with a budget ki > 0 that determines the maximum number of edges the
agent can create. The budgets k1, k2, . . . , kn are specified exogenously and, in general,
need not be identical. We refer to the special case when all edge budgets are identical
(i.e., ∀i ∈ N, ki = k) as uniform instances of the UBBC game.
Edge formation is unilateral, so a joint strategy s = (s1, . . . , sn) induces a network
Gs = (N,Es) with edges Es = {{i, j} : j ∈ si}, and the cost to an agent i given s is
defined to be
ci(s) = di(s) =
∑
j∈N
ℓGs(i, j). (4)
The social cost for the UBBC game is defined as it is in the UC game; i.e., the sum of
the costs incurred by the individual agents,
C(s) =
∑
i∈N
ci(s).
The remainder of this section includes some simple facts regarding Nash equilibria
and efficient outcomes of the UBBC game. The first lemma is from Eshani et al. and
identifies a sufficient condition for a joint strategy to be a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 1 ([EFM+11]). A UBBC strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) that induces a network
Gs without parallel edges and a diameter of at most 2 is a Nash equilibrium.
The next two results identify properties of efficient outcomes for uniform instances
of the UBBC game. Lemma 2 discerns the social cost of efficient networks while Propo-
sition 2 shows that, for sufficiently sparse instances, efficient outcomes are necessarily
networks with a diameter of two. The proofs of Lemma 2 and Proposition 2 can be
found in Appendix A.
Lemma 2. The social cost of any efficient strategy profile for a uniform UBBC instance
with edge budgets k ≥ 1 is
2n(n− 1)− 2nk.
Proposition 2. Every uniform UBBC instance with k < (n − 1)/2 has an efficient
outcome with a diameter of 2.
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3 NIR Upper Bounds
This section presents our results on upper bounding the Nash Inequality Ratio for the
two network formation games. NIR upper bounds are established for the UC game in
Section 3.1 (see Theorem 1) and for the UBBC game in Section 3.2 (see Theorem 2).
3.1 The Undirected Connections Game
We establish upper bounds on the NIR for the UC game for two regimes of α: when
α < 1 and α ≥ 1. These bounds are stated in Theorem 1, showing that inequality is
independent of the number of agents when α is a constant. Our upper bound implies
that when α > 3, inequality scales linearly with α.
Theorem 1. Upper bounds on the NIR for the UC game:
1. When α < 1, the NIR is at most 1 + α < 2.
2. When 1 ≤ α <∞ is a constant (independent of n), the NIR is at most max{2, 1+α2 }
in the limit as n→∞.
We will prove the two parts of Theorem 1 separately in Lemma 3 (next) and Lemma 6
(below).
Lemma 3. When α < 1, the NIR for the UC games is at most 1 + α < 2.
Proof. From Proposition 1 we know that whenever α < 1 then the only Nash equilibrium
is a complete graph, and every agent is adjacent to n− 1 other agents. In the complete
graph, the usage costs incurred by every agent is the same, and the only disparity that
can arise is due to the agents’ construction costs. In the most extreme case, the min-cost
agent does not buy any links and the max-cost agent buys m > 0 links. The inequality
ratio is therefore
(n− 1) + αm
n− 1 = 1 +
αm
n− 1 ≤ 1 + α,
where m can be at most n− 1 (i.e., m = n− 1 when the max-cost agent buys all of their
incident links). It is easy to see that the max-cost agent is not inclined to discard any of
their edges since doing so would increase their usage cost by 1 but only yield a savings
of α < 1 in their construction cost, resulting in a net cost increase.
Before addressing the second case of Theorem 1, we first need a couple of lemmas.
In Lemma 4, we give an expression that captures the inequality ratio for an arbitrary
Nash equilibrium of the UC game, and then show in Corollary 1 that this quantity is
maximized in star networks. Then, in Lemma 5, we bound the inequality ratio of star
network topologies.
Lemma 4 and Corollary 1 require additional notation. We refer to a min-cost and
max-cost agent as µ ∈ argmini∈N ci(s) and χ ∈ argmaxi∈N ci(s), respectively. Note
that, in general, there may exist multiple min- and max-cost agents in any given Nash
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equilibrium, but in the following, we assume that µ and χ refer to the same min- and
max-cost agents throughout the argument. For an agent i and a joint strategy s, let
Ts(i) denote a shortest-path tree rooted at i that is built from a breadth-first traversal
of Gs beginning at node/agent i.
7 Edges of Gs that appear in Ts(i) are referred to as
tree edges, and those that do not are non-tree edges. By construction, for any agent j
that appears in layer k ≥ 0 of Ts(i), it follows that ℓs(i, j) = k. Also, for any agent j
appearing in layer k and every non-tree edge {j, j′}, it follows (from the construction of
Ts(i)) that agent j
′ must be in layer k′ ∈ {k − 1, k, k + 1}.
For a pair of agents i, j, let Ts(j; i) denote the subtree of Ts(i) that is rooted at j
such that, without loss of generality, all agents j′ that are adjacent to j in Gs and are
in layer ℓs(i, j) + 1 of Ts(i), are present in the first layer of the subtree Ts(j; i). With a
slight abuse of notation, we will use Ts(j; i) to refer to the set of agents in the subtree
as well as the subtree itself. Finally, let T¯s(j; i) refer to the subtree (and its constituent
agents) of Ts(i) that are not a part of Ti(j; i). See Figure 1 for an illustration with i = µ
and j = χ and solid (dotted) lines representing tree (non-tree) edges.
Lemma 4. Let µ and χ be min- and max-cost agents in a Nash equilibrium s. The
inequality ratio is at most
IR(s) =
cχ(s)
cµ(s)
≤ α (1 + |sχ ∩ Ts(χ;µ)|) + |T¯s(χ;µ)| − ℓs(χ, µ) · |Ts(χ;µ)|+ dµ(s)
dµ(s)
, (5)
where dµ(s) =
∑
i ℓs(µ, i) is the distance-cost for agent µ.
Intuitively, the bound in Equation 5 follows from deriving upper- and lower-bounds
on the costs of the max- and min-cost agents, respectively. The upper bound on the
cost of the max-cost agent, χ, follows from considering a strategic deviation whereby
χ builds a direct link to a min-cost agent µ and then drops all of its purchased links
except those to agents j ∈ sχ that are further from µ than χ is. If the original strategy
is a Nash equilibrium, then we know that χ’s cost must be no higher than its cost given
this new strategy.8 The cost lower bound for a min-cost agent, µ, follows from simply
assuming that µ did not purchase any edges (i.e., cµ(s) ≥ dµ(s)).
Proof. Let χ and µ be a max- and min-cost agent, respectively, in a Nash equilibrium
strategy s, and let Ts(µ), Ts(χ;µ), and T¯s(χ;µ) be as defined above. Consider the
strategy s′χ for agent χ that is obtained from sχ by dropping all of χ’s edges to agents
outside of Ts(χ;µ) and buying an edge to µ (see Figure 1). Agent χ’s cost under this
new strategy s′ = (s′χ, s−χ) is
cχ(s
′) ≤ α (1 + |sχ ∩ Ts(χ;µ)|)︸ ︷︷ ︸
bχ(s′)
+ |T¯s(χ;µ)| − ℓs(µ, χ) · |Ts(χ;µ)|+ dµ(s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
upper-bound on dχ(s′)
. (6)
7Arguments using such trees are commonly used in the analysis of the Price of Anarchy for network
formation games; see, for example, Albers et al. [AEED+14].
8Our derivation of this upper bound on χ’s cost extends a similar argument used by Albers et al.
[AEED+14]. In particular, compare our Equation (6) below with Equation (2) in [AEED+14].
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Layer 0
Layer 1
Layer 2
Layer 3
Ts(χ : µ)T¯s(χ : µ)
Ts(µ) µ
χ
Figure 1: An induced shortest-path tree, Ts(µ), of a graph Gs rooted at a min-cost agent
µ. Solid edges represent tree-edges, and dotted edges represent non-tree-edges. Given a
max-cost agent χ 6= µ in layer k = ℓs(µ, χ), the tree Ts(χ;µ) is the subtree rooted at χ
with the stipulation that every i in layer k+1 that is adjacent to χ in Gs is in Ts(χ;µ).
T¯s(χ;µ) represents the part of Ts(µ) made up of agents/nodes that are not a part of
Ts(χ;µ).
Because s is a Nash equilibrium, we know that cχ(s) ≤ cχ(s′), and the lemma follows
from (6) and the fact that cµ(s) ≥ dµ(s).
Agent χ’s usage cost, bχ(s
′), simply reflects the construction of s′χ – building an edge
to µ and dropping all edges to nodes in sχ that are outside of Ts(χ;µ). The remainder of
the proof is dedicated to establishing the upper bound on dχ(s
′). For a set X ⊂ N , let
dXi (s) =
∑
j∈X ℓs(i, j) denote agent i’s usage cost to agents in X given the joint strategy
s. We will bound dχ(s
′) in terms of dµ(s) = d
Ts(χ;µ)
µ (s) + d
T¯s(χ;µ)
µ (s). Notice that
dTs(χ;µ)µ (s) =
∑
i∈Ts(χ;µ)
(ℓs(µ, χ) + ℓs(χ, i))
= ℓs(µ, χ) · |Ts(χ;µ)|+
∑
i∈Ts(χ;µ)
ℓs(χ, i)
= ℓs(µ, χ) · |Ts(χ;µ)|+ dTs(χ;µ)χ (s)
since χ is on a shortest-path between µ and every agent i ∈ Ts(χ;µ). Rearranging, we
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get
dTs(χ;µ)χ (s) = d
Ts(χ;µ)
µ (s)− ℓs(µ, χ) · |Ts(χ;µ)|.
In s′, χ’s distance to agents in Ts(χ;µ) is unchanged from s, so we can express χ’s usage
cost to agents in Ts(χ;µ) under s
′ in relation to µ’s distance to agents in Ts(χ;µ) under
s as
dTs(χ;µ)χ (s
′) = dTs(χ;µ)µ (s)− ℓs(µ, χ) · |Ts(χ;µ)|. (7)
Next, we can derive d
T¯s(χ;µ)
χ (s′) in terms of d
T¯s(χ;µ)
µ (s) in a very straight-forward way.
By including a link to µ in s′χ and dropping all links to agents outside of Ts(χ;µ), χ’s
usage cost to agents in T¯s(χ;µ) is at most |T¯s(χ;µ)| more than µ’s usage cost to agents
in T¯s(χ;µ) under s; i.e.,
dT¯s(χ;µ)χ (s
′) ≤ |T¯s(χ;µ)|+ dT¯s(χ;µ)µ (s). (8)
Putting (7) and (8) together, we get
dχ(s
′) = dTs(χ;µ)χ (s
′) + dT¯s(χ;µ)χ (s
′)
≤ dTs(χ;µ)µ (s)− ℓs(µ, χ) · |Ts(χ;µ)|+ |T¯s(χ;µ)|+ dT¯s(χ;µ)µ (s)
= dµ(s)− ℓs(µ, χ) · |Ts(χ;µ)|+ |T¯s(χ;µ)|,
where we substituted dµ(s) = d
Ts(χ;µ)
µ (s) + d
T¯s(χ;µ)
µ (s) in the last line. This completes
the proof.
Corollary 1. Among Nash equilibrium strategies that arise when the edge construction
cost is a constant 1 ≤ α <∞, the star topology maximizes the inequality ratio.
Proof. We will show that the inequality ratio established in Lemma 4 is maximized in a
star network topology. Recall Equation (5), bounding the inequality ratio of an arbitrary
Nash equilibrium strategy s for the UC game, repeated here for convenience:
IR(s) ≤ α (1 + |sχ ∩ Ts(χ;µ)|) + |T¯s(χ;µ)| − ℓs(χ, µ) · |Ts(χ;µ)|+ dµ(s)
dµ(s)
. (5)
Let x = |Ts(χ;µ)| (ergo, |T¯s(χ;µ)| = n−x) and x0 = 1+|sχ∩Ts(χ;µ)| ≤ x. Substituting
dµ(s) = d
Ts(χ;µ)
µ (s) + d
T¯s(χ;µ)
µ (s)
= ℓs(χ, µ)x+ d
Ts(χ;µ)
χ (s) + d
T¯s(χ;µ)
µ (s),
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we can rewrite (5) as
IR(s) ≤ αx0 + (n− x)− ℓs(χ, µ)x+ dµ(s)
dµ(s)
=
αx0 + n− x− ℓs(χ, µ)x+ dTs(χ;µ)µ (s) + dT¯s(χ;µ)µ (s)
d
Ts(χ;µ)
µ (s) + d
T¯s(χ;µ)
µ (s)
=
αx0 + n− x− ℓs(χ, µ)x+ ℓs(χ, µ)x+ dTs(χ;µ)χ (s) + dT¯s(χ;µ)µ (s)
ℓs(χ, µ)x+ d
Ts(χ;µ)
χ (s) + d
T¯s(χ;µ)
µ (s)
=
αx0 − n− x+ dTs(χ;µ)χ (s) + dT¯s(χ;µ)µ (s)
ℓs(χ, µ)x+ d
Ts(χ;µ)
χ (s) + d
T¯s(χ;µ)
µ (s)
. (9)
Notice that in Equation (9), the distance between µ and χ in Gs only appears in the
denominator. Therefore, toward our aim of maximizing (9), we can infer that ℓs(χ, µ) =
1. Hence, µ and χ are necessarily adjacent in a Nash equilibrium s that maximizes the
inequality ratio. With µ and χ adjacent, we can substitute
dT¯s(χ;µ)µ (s) = d
T¯s(χ;µ)
χ (s)− |T¯s(χ;µ)| = dT¯s(χ;µ)χ (s)− n+ x
and
dTs(χ;µ)χ (s) = d
Ts(χ;µ)
µ (s)− |Ts(χ;µ)| = dTs(χ;µ)µ (s)− x,
giving us
IR(s) ≤ αx0 + dχ(s)− 2x− n
dµ(s) + 2x− n . (10)
This leaves us with two approaches to identify topologies that maximize the inequality
ratio: we can maximize x0 (i.e., by setting x0 = n − 1), or we can minimize x (i.e., set
x = 1). Both approaches imply star network topologies (the center- and peripheral-
sponsored stars, respectively), completing the proof.
The next lemma establishes asymptotically tight upper bound on the inequality ratio
for star network topologies when the edge cost 1 ≤ α <∞.
Lemma 5. As the number of agents grows toward infinity, the maximal inequality in a
star topology for the UC network formation game with a constant edge cost 1 ≤ α < ∞
is max{2, (1 + α)/2}.
The proof of Lemma 5 is straight-forward, so we provide only a sketch here. The full
proof can be found in Appendix A.
Proof Sketch. We consider two star topologies: the center-sponsored star strategy and
the peripheral-sponsored star strategy. It is easy to see that the inequality in these two
star strategies dominate that of all other star strategies (see the full proof in Appendix A
for details).
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In the center-sponsored star strategy, sc, the max-cost agent χ is in the center and
the min-cost agent µ is in the periphery. Therefore, the inequality ratio is
IR(sc) =
cχ(s
c)
cµ(sc)
=
(α+ 1)(n − 1)
2n− 3 .
In the peripheral-sponsored star strategy, sp, the min-cost agent µ is in the center and
the max-cost agent χ is in the periphery. Hence, the inequality ratio is
IR(sp) =
cχ(s
p)
cµ(sp)
=
α+ 2n − 3
n− 1 .
As n → ∞, IR(sc) approaches (1 + α)/2 and IR(sp) approaches 2. Therefore, the
inequality ratio for a star network is max{2, (1 + α)/2} as n grows to infinity.
Finally, we are ready to prove the second case of Theorem 1, which will follow directly
from Lemmas 4 and 5 and Corollary 1.
Lemma 6. When 1 ≤ α < ∞ is a constant (independent of n), the NIR for the UC
game is at most max{2, (1 + α)/2} in the limit as n→∞.
Proof. From Corollary 1 we know that, among Nash equilibrium strategies, the star
maximizes the inequality ratio; and Lemma 5 provides the desired IR upper bound for
stars.
3.2 The Undirected Bounded Budget Connections Game
For the UBBC game, the NIR is at most two (Theorem 2). This bound holds for
uniform instances of the game, in which every agent has the same edge budget, as well
as general cases in which agents can have heterogenous budgets. This upper bound is
tight, demonstrating that inequality at equilibrium in the UBBC game is independent
of ex ante inequalities in edge endowments.
Theorem 2. The NIR for the UBBC game is at most 2.
The proof of Theorem 2 (see below) proceeds as follows: we argue that in any
strategy profile where the agents with the maximum and minimum costs are adjacent,
the inequality ratio must be strictly less than two. If, on the other hand, the min-cost
and max-cost agents are not adjacent in a Nash equilibrium, it must be the case that
neither of them stand to reduce their individual costs by switching to a strategy that
includes a link with the other agent, since doing so would mean that the strategy is not
a Nash equilibrium in the first place. This implies that either:
1. The inequality ratio is already less than 2; or
2. A maximum cost agent switching to a strategy that includes a link to a minimum
cost agent would lead them to a higher cost (i.e., by disconnecting the network).
12
zX
x
a
a
a
a
Y
y
v
w
j
Figure 2: A schematic of the conditions expressed in Lemma 7.
However, by Lemma 7, case 2 cannot be a Nash equilibrium, so the NIR can be at most
2.
Lemma 7. Suppose s = (s1, . . . , sn) is a UBBC strategy in which there exist (distinct)
agents x, y, z ∈ N with x ∈ sz, y /∈ sz, and z /∈ sy such that:
1. Every x→ y path in Gs contains agent z as an intermediate node, and
2. If z were to swap out x for a connection with agent y, then the network will become
disconnected (i.e., the edge {z, x} is a bridge).
Then s cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
The proof of Lemma 7 employs the main result of [MS12], regarding the structure
of networks in asymmetric swap-equilibrium. The asymmetric swap-equilibrium holds
for a strategy s when, for every agent i ∈ N and every deviation s′i that differs from
si with the addition, removal, or swap of a single edge, we have ci(si, s−i) ≤ ci(s′i, s−i).
The asymmetric swap-equilibrium is a weaker equilibrium concept than the Nash equi-
librium for the UBBC, so their result (restated in Theorem 3 below) carries over to Nash
equilibrium for the UBBC. Recall that a graph is k-edge-connected if the removal of any
k − 1 edges does not disconnect it. A k-edge-connected component of a graph G is a
maximal subgraph G′ ⊂ G that is k-edge-connected.
Theorem 3 ([MS12]). Every network in an asymmetric swap-equilibrium has at most
one 2-edge-connected component.
Put another way, Theorem 3 states that a Nash equilibrium strategy s will not induce
a graph Gs in which the removal of a single edge will split the graph into two components
that are both 2-edge-connected; i.e., the two components cannot both contain cycles.
Proof of Lemma 7. Let s be a strategy with agents x, y, z ∈ N that satisfy the given
conditions and assume (toward a contradiction) that s is a Nash equilibrium. Denote
by X the component of the network containing x that would result from the removal of
x from agent z’s strategy, and let Y = N \X ∪ {z} be the set of the remaining agents
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(not in X) also excluding agent z (see Figure 2). Recall that every agent i contributes
at least one edge to Gs (since ki ≥ 1) so the component X must contain a cycle. Hence,
by Theorem 3, we know that the subgraph induced by agents in Y must not contain a
cycle.
Let GY denote the subgraph induced by the agents in Y . If ∃j ∈ Y such that kj > 1
then either |sj| < kj and j is not playing a best response (since they could build an edge
to an non-neighboring agent and decrease their cost) or GY will contain a cycle; both
scenarios contradicting our assumption that s is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, assume
that the subgraph GY is a tree, and that kj = 1 for all j ∈ Y . Clearly, for every path
p = (y1, y2, . . . , ym = z) that begins at an agent y1 ∈ Y and ends at z, we have yi+1 ∈ syi
(to be otherwise would imply that kj > 1 for some j ∈ Y ).
Let j ∈ Y be a leaf in GY that is furthest from z. Let w ∈ sj be j’s parent, and
let v ∈ sw be j’s grandparent. If w = z then we are done because this contradicts our
assumption that y and z are not adjacent in Gs. So assume that w 6= z. Let Dw be
w’s descendants in GY (i.e., the set of agents for whom w lies on their unique path to
z), and let Cw ⊆ Dw be w’s children (i.e., the set of agents in Dw that are adjacent to
w). Consider a deviation by j to the strategy s′j = {v} that replaces j’s link to their
parent with a link to their grandparent. This deviation will increase j’s distance to w
and all nodes in Cw \ {j} by one and decrease j’s distance to every node in N \Cw \ {j}
by one. If |Cw| < |N \ Cw| − 1 then agent j will benefit from switching to strategy s′j,
contradicting our assumption that s is a Nash equilibrium.
Suppose that |Cw| ≥ |N \ Cw| − 1, which implies that |Cw| ≥ (n − 1)/2. Let u ∈ sv
be w’s grandparent in GY . If there is another agent w
′ with v ∈ sw′ then this agent can
swap their link to v with a link to w and receive a strictly lower cost, which implies that
s was not a Nash equilibrium. If there is no such w′, then w can swap their link to v
with a link to their grandparent u and receive a strictly lower cost. This again implies
that s was not a Nash equilibrium. This completes the proof.
We are now ready to attend to the proof of Theorem 2. We will use the shorthand
G− {i, j} to denote the graph G with the edge {i, j} removed.
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider (toward a contradiction) a strategy profile s that is a Nash
equilibrium in which cmax(s) ≥ 2 ·cmin(s); i.e., a strategy s such that the inequality ratio
is at least 2. Notice that in this strategy an agent χ with cχ(s) = cmax(s) cannot be
directly connected to an agent µ with cµ(s) = cmin(s), because if it were then χ would
be connected to the n− 2 other agents via µ’s shortest paths for a cost that is at most
n− 2 more than the cost µ is subjected to. That is, if χ ∈ sµ or µ ∈ sχ then
cχ(s) ≤ (n− 2) + cµ(s) < 2 · cµ(s). (11)
The strict inequality in (11) comes from the fact that cµ(s) > n−2 since it is impossible
for µ to connect to n− 1 other agents for a cost any less than n− 1. Therefore, in order
for cχ(s) ≥ 2 · cµ(s), it must be the case that µ /∈ sχ and χ /∈ sµ. This implies that cχ(s)
must be no greater than (n− 2)+ cµ(s), since switching to a strategy s′χ that includes a
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link to agent µ would ensure as much, provided that switching to s′χ does not disconnect
the network.
Suppose that cχ(s) > (n− 2) + cµ(s) and if χ were to switch to a strategy s′χ that is
obtained by swapping out some x ∈ sχ for a link to µ results in the network G(s′χ,s−χ)
becoming disconnected. Then it must be that every x→ µ path in Gs includes agent χ,
in which case it follows that the component of Gs − {χ, x} including x contains a cycle
since every agent’s budget affords them at least one edge. However, by Lemma 7, such a
strategy s cannot be a Nash equilibrium, contradicting our assumption that s is a Nash
equilibrium. This completes the proof.
The upper bound established by Theorem 2 is asymptotically tight. This can be
observed in a “star-like” network in which every agent has a link to the min-cost agent
µ, and the degree of the max-cost agent χ is bounded by a constant independent of the
number of agents, n.9 In the asymptotic limit, as the number of agents tends toward
infinity, the inequality ratio between χ and µ equals 2.
4 Equality, Equilibrium, and Efficiency
With the upper bounds on inequality in Nash equilibrium strategies established, we
are now in a position to address the relationship between (in)equality, equilibrium, and
efficiency. Although our focus here is on a specific metric of inequality (the inequality
ratio) and how it relates to efficiency in a particular setting (the network formation
games), the connection between inequality and efficiency more generally is a matter
of considerable interest among economic analysts, researchers, and policy makers (cf.
[BP97, BP98, DA06, BFW07, Bow12]), as well as the general public [Sti12, Pik14]. As
in Section 3, the presentation of this section is divided into two parts, with the UC game
analyzed in 4.1 (see Theorem 4) followed by the UBBC in Section 4.2 (see Theorem 5).
4.1 The Undirected Connections Game
Theorem 4 summarizes our results on the relationship between equality, efficiency, and
Nash equilibrium for the UC game for the three regimes of α identified in Proposition 1.
Theorem 4. The relationship between inequality, Nash equilibrium, and efficiency in
the UC game:
1. When α < 1, there exist efficient Nash equilibrium strategies that maximize the
inequality ratio, and other efficient Nash equilibrium strategies that achieve cost
equality in the limit as n→∞.
2. When 1 ≤ α < 2, no Nash equilibrium strategy is also efficient. However, among
Nash equilibrium strategies, there exist some that maximize the inequality ratio,
while others are egalitarian in the limit as n→∞.
9For a concrete example, consider a uniform instance of the UBBC game in which ki = 1 for all
i ∈ N , and the Nash equilibrium strategy that forms a star network with one “extra” edge linking a pair
of peripheral agents.
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3. When 2 ≤ α <∞, there exist Nash equilibrium strategies that are
• both efficient and egalitarian in the limit as n→∞; and
• efficient with maximal inequality in the limit as n→∞.
We will prove the three parts of Theorem 4 individually in the next three lemmas.
Lemma 8. When α < 1, there exist efficient Nash equilibrium strategies for the UC
game that maximize the inequality ratio, and other efficient Nash equilibrium strategies
that achieve cost equality in the limit as n→∞.
Proof. By Proposition 1, when α < 1, both Nash equilibrium strategies and socially
efficient strategies result in the formation of the complete network. From this fact and
Theorem 1, it follows that there exist socially efficient strategies which maximize the
inequality ratio. Therefore, we only need to show that there exist equilibrium strategies
that achieve cost equality.
Equality among all agents would follow if every agent builds exactly (n−1)/2 edges,
which can only occur when n is odd. When, on the other hand, n is even, then (n−1)/2 is
non-integral; so the closest we can get to equality calls for a strategy s in which the max-
cost agents each build ⌈(n−1)/2⌉ edges while the min-cost agents get away with building
one fewer edge each. In this case, a min-cost agent’s cost is cmin(s) = cmax(s)− α, and
the inequality ratio is
IR(s) =
cmax(s)
cmax(s)− α
=
(n− 1)− ⌈(n− 1)/2⌉α
(n− 1)− (⌈(n − 1)/2⌉ − 1)α
= 1− α
α+ α⌊(1 − n)/2⌋+ n− 1 . (12)
As n → ∞, Equation (12) approaches 1. Hence, inequality vanishes as n increases,
concluding the proof.
Turning to the second item of Theorem 4, which addresses the case that α ∈ [1, 2),
we first note that Proposition 1 already implies that no Nash equilibrium strategy is
also an efficient strategy. This is because the Nash equilibrium strategies for this regime
of α correspond to networks with star topologies while efficient strategies correspond to
complete networks in which every possible edge is present. Furthermore, by Corollary 1
we know that the upper bound on the inequality ratio for this regime of α is achieved
in a star topology. Hence, to prove the second item of Theorem 4 we need only address
the existence of equilibrium strategies for which there is cost equality among the agents.
Lemma 9. When 1 ≤ α < 2, the UC game admits a Nash equilibrium strategy that is
egalitarian in the limit as n→∞.
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Proof. Consider a joint strategy s inducing a star network topology among the |N | = n
agents in which the central agent c ∈ N buys k = 1 + ⌊n−2
α
⌋ edges {c, i} to agents
N¬b ⊂ N ; all the remaining edges {j, c} are paid for by their respective peripheral agent
j ∈ Nb = N \N¬b ∪ {c}. (The sets Nb and N¬b partition N so that all agents that buy
edges appear in Nb and all those who do not buy any edges appear in N¬b.) In this
strategy, the agents i ∈ N¬b all incur a cost ci(s) = 2n − 3, all agents j ∈ Nb incur a
cost of cj(s) = 2n − 3 + α, and c incurs a cost cc(s) = n − 1 + αk ≤ 2n − 3 + α. Since
ci(s) < cc(s) ≤ cj(s), the inequality ratio is:
IR(s) =
cj(s)
ci(s)
=
2n − 3 + α
2n− 3 = 1 +
α
2n− 3 , (13)
which approaches 1 in the limit as n → ∞. It is easy to see that s is in fact a Nash
equilibrium since no agent stands to reduce their cost by deleting an edge (since doing
so would disconnect the network, prompting an infinite cost) and, at the cost of α ≥ 1
per edge, the addition of any edges will decrease the agent’s usage cost only by 1 (per
edge), yielding no net decrease in the agent’s total cost.
Finally, the third item of Theorem 4 addresses the regime when α is a constant
greater than or equal to 2. In this regime, we show that there exist some efficient Nash
equilibrium strategies that are egalitarian, and other efficient Nash equilibrium strategies
that achieve maximal inequality.
Lemma 10. When 2 ≤ α <∞, there exist Nash equilibrium strategies in the UC game
which are both efficient and egalitarian in the limit as n → ∞; and there are Nash
equilibrium strategies that are both efficient and achieve maximal inequality.
Proof. Recall from Proposition 1 that, when α ≥ 2 the star is an efficient Nash equilib-
rium strategy. Thus, the lemma will follow if we can show that some star strategies can
support maximal inequality while others can support equality.
To show the first part of the lemma (the existence of an egalitarian strategy that
yields to a star network topology), we can invoke the strategy constructed in the proof
of Lemma 9. Recall that this strategy calls for the central agent c ∈ N to buy 1+ ⌊n−2
α
⌋
edges to peripheral agents N¬b ⊂ N , and all remaining agents j ∈ N \ N¬b ∪ {c} buy
a single edge to c. The inequality ratio for this strategy is expressed by Equation 13,
which approaches 1 in the limit as n→∞, and is hence egalitarian.
The second part of the lemma (the existence of a star-topology-yielding strategy that
achieves the inequality upper bound established in Theorem 1) follows immediately from
Corollary 1, which states that inequality in the UC game is maximized in networks with
a star topology.
4.2 The Undirected Bounded Budget Connections Game
This section establishes the relationship between efficient Nash equilibrium strategies
and (in)equality in the UBBC game with uniform budgets. We find that when the
17
k = 1 O(1) 2
√
n− 1 n− 1
eff. w/ max IR
no eff. w/ minimal IR eff. w/ minimal IR
Figure 3: A summary of Theorem 5, characterizing the existence of Nash equilibrium
strategies in the UBBC game with respect to efficiency and the inequality ratio for
different uniform budgets, k.
budget k is sufficiently small (k = O(1)) we can construct an efficient Nash equilibrium
strategy in which inequality is maximized; and when the edge budget is sufficiently large
(k ≥ 2√n− 1) then we show the existence of efficient Nash equilibrium strategies in
which there is cost equality among all of the agents. Finally, we prove the non-existence
of efficient Nash equilibrium strategies with egalitarian costs when k < 2
√
n− 1. These
findings are formally presented in Theorem 5 and summarized in Figure 3.
Theorem 5. The relationship between inequality, Nash equilibrium, and efficiency in
the UBBC game with uniform budgets k:
1. When k ≥ 1 is a constant (independent of n), there exists an efficient Nash equi-
librium strategy that achieves the NIR upper bound of 2 established in Theorem 2.
2. When k ≥ 2√n− 1, there exist efficient Nash equilibrium strategies that are egali-
tarian.
3. When 1 ≤ k < 2√n− 1, there does not exist an efficient Nash equilibrium strategy
that is egalitarian.
Lemma 11. In the UBBC game with constant (independent from n) uniform edge bud-
gets k ≥ 1, there exists an efficient Nash equilibrium strategy that achieves the NIR
upper bound of 2.
Proof. Fix k and let N = {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} denote the set of strategic agents. We will
construct an efficient Nash equilibrium strategy s as follows (see Figure 4):
1. ∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}, set si = {i+ 1, i+ 2, . . . , i+ k}.
2. ∀i ∈ {k + 1, k + 2, . . . , 2k − 1}, set si = {0, 1, . . . , i− k − 1, i + 1, i+ 2, . . . , 2k}.
3. ∀i ∈ {2k, 2k + 1, . . . , n− 1}, set si = {0, 1, . . . , k − 1}.
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Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Figure 4: Example of the three parts to the strategy constructed in the proof of
Lemma 11. Dark nodes and edges are those assigned in the specified step and arrows
are meant to convey link “ownership”.
The strategy s produces a network that has a diameter of 2. Thus, per Lemma 1, it is
a Nash equilibrium.
To show that s is socially efficient, we must determine its social cost. We can partition
the agents N into three sets that correspond to three “tiers” of costs:
• Agents in Na = {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} are each directly connected to every other agent,
so ci(s) = n− 1 for all i ∈ Na. Agents in Na incur the minimal cost among N .
• Agents in Nb = {2k + 1, 2k + 2, . . . , n− 1} are each directly linked to every agent
in Na and two-hops away from every other agent, so ci(s) = 2(n − 1) − k for all
i ∈ Nb. Agents in Nb incur the maximal cost among N .
• Agents Nc = {k, k + 1, . . . , 2k} each have a direct link to every agent in Na and
Nc and a two-hop distance to agents in Nb, so ci(s) = 2(n − k − 1) for all i ∈ Nc.
The cardinality of these partitions are |Na| = k, |Nb| = n − 2k − 1, and |Nc| = k + 1,
and the social cost is
C(s) = [k(n− 1)] + [(n− 2k − 1)(2(n − 1)− k)] + [(k + 1)(2(n − k − 1))]
= 2(n2 − n− kn).
By Lemma 2, this is the minimal social cost in a uniform game with size-k budgets.
Therefore, s is socially efficient.
The inequality ratio is between a min-cost agent i ∈ Na and a max-cost agent j ∈ Nb;
IR(s) =
cj(s)
ci(s)
=
2(n− 1)− k
n− 1 = 2−
k
n− 1 . (14)
Since (14) approaches 2 as n → ∞, this strategy maximizes the inequality ratio estab-
lished for the UBBC in Theorem 2. Hence, s is an efficient Nash equilibrium strategy
that achieves maximal inequality.
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The next lemma establishes the second part of Theorem 5, showing that when edge
budgets are sufficiently large, we can find an efficient Nash equilibrium strategy which
achieves perfect equality among the agents. But first we need the following fact (see
Appendix A for a proof):
Fact 1. A δ-regular graph of diameter two can have at most n = δ2 + 1 nodes.10
Lemma 12. In the UBBC game with uniform edge budgets k ≥ 2√n− 1, there exists
efficient Nash equilibrium strategies that are egalitarian.
Proof. For a strategy s to be efficient and egalitarian, it must be the case that Gs has a
diameter of at most 2, and all agents have common one- and two-hop neighborhood sizes.
When k ≥ (n − 1)/2, then this is trivially satisfied by the complete graph. Satisfying
both of these properties for k < (n−1)/2 requires that Gs be 2k-regular with a diameter
of 2. From Fact 1, we know that such graphs are only possible if k ≥ 2√n− 1.
Finally, we turn to the third part of Theorem 5, which establishes the non-existence
of efficient Nash equilibrium strategies that are egalitarian when edge budgets are below
2
√
n− 1. The non-existence follows as a corollary of Fact 1 and Proposition 2 by observ-
ing that when k < 2
√
n− 1, there are not enough edges to create a regular, diameter-2
network.
Corollary 2. When 1 ≤ k < 2√n− 1, there does not exist an efficient Nash equilibrium
strategy that is egalitarian.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper examines inequality in two simple models of strategic network formation:
the Undirected Connections (UC) game of Fabrikant et al. [FLM+03] and the
Undirected Bounded Budget Connections (UBBC) game introduced by Ehsani
et al. [EFM+11]. To this end, we introduce the Nash Inequality Ratio (NIR) as an
instrument to quantify the level of inequality that can exist between a pair of agents in
a Nash equilibrium. Upper bounds on the NIR are established for both games, and we
show that these bounds are tight.
Our analysis of these games reveal an interesting relationship between scarcity (ex-
pressed by lower budgets in the UBBC model and high edge costs in the UC model)
and inequality. In the UBBC game, we found that when edges are scarce the inequality
upper-bound is attainable in Nash equilibrium; but when edges are more plentiful, the
highest level of inequality is not sustainable in equilibrium. A similar correspondence
is observed in the UC model, where higher edge costs can support maximal inequality
in equilibrium. With respect to efficiency, we find that the two games behave differ-
ently from one another: in the UC game, scarcity can support efficient Nash equilibrium
strategies with either egalitarian costs or maximal inequality; but the UBBC game only
supports efficient Nash equilibrium strategies that not egalitarian when edges are scarce.
10Recall that a δ-regular graph/network is a graph in which every node has δ neighbors.
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The NIR affords a wide-angle lens through which inequality can be analyzed, charac-
terizing the extent to which the costs incurred by a pair of agents can differ in equilibrium.
It does not, however, provide a clear view on the distribution of inequality among popu-
lations of agents, nor does it identify the inequality ratio of a “typical” Nash equilibrium
strategy. Indeed, in our analysis of both network formation games we often relied on
the inequality furnished by networks with a star topology in which there is a single,
central agent that incurred the lowest (or sometimes highest) cost while the remaining
n − 1 agents all incurred the highest (or lowest) cost. In star networks, the inequality
between a pair of agents selected uniformly at random is, with a high probability, nonex-
istent since neither agent will likely be the central agent. One interesting direction for
future research that extends the analysis presented here to derive upper bounds on the
expected inequality ratio between randomly selected pairs of agents. A related problem
is to bound the inequality ratio of a randomly chosen Nash equilibrium strategy, or from
the set of equilibrium strategies that result from a particular game dynamic like best-
or approximate-best-response.
We believe that an analysis of the NIR will provide interesting insight into many
other games beyond the two network formation games analyzed here. As with the Price
of Anarchy, the NIR can be used to establish a bound on the “price” of strategic behavior
by answering the question: To what extent can the speed of costs/benefits be found in
equilibrium outcomes of distributed decision making by self-interested agents? It may
be anarchy, but is it fair?
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A Omitted Proofs
Lemma 2. The social cost of any efficient strategy profile for a uniform UBBC instance
with edge budgets k ≥ 1 is
2n(n− 1)− 2nk. (15)
Proof. Let Cmin(n, k) be the social cost of an efficient outcome for a uniform UBBC
instance with n agents, each with a budget of k edges. When k = kmax = (n− 1)/2, the
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complete graph is the efficient outcome with a social cost of Cmin(n, kmax) = n(n − 1).
Because an individual edge must lie on at least two shortest paths (e.g., the edge {i, j}
is on both the i→ j and j → i paths), starting from the complete network, every edge
removal increases the social cost by at least 2. Therefore, decreasing the edge budget by
one reduces the social cost by at least 2n. Hence, we can express Cmin(n, k) by
Cmin(n, k) = n(n− 1) + 2n(kmax − k).
Substituting kmax = (n− 1)/2 gives
Cmin(n, k) = n(n− 1) + 2n
(
n− 1
2
− k
)
,
which can be rearranged into Equation (15), completing the proof.
Proposition 2. Every uniform UBBC instance with k < (n − 1)/2 has an efficient
outcome with a diameter of 2.
Proving Propositon 2 relies on the following lemma:
Lemma 13. The social costs of all diameter-2 topologies with a fixed number of m ≤
n(n−1)
2 non-overlapping edges are equivalent.
Proof. Suppose that s is a joint strategy profile which induces a diameter-2 network
Gs with m distinct (i.e., non-parallel) edges. Because Gs has a diameter of 2, we can
express the cost incurred by each agent i ∈ N in terms of their degree and the cardinality
of their one- and two-hop neighborhoods. Let Nx(Gs, i) and d(Gs, i) denote i’s x-hop
neighborhood and degree, respectively, in Gs. The cost to i can be expressed as
ci(s) = d(Gs, i) + 2|N2(Gs, i) \N1(Gs, i)| = d(Gsi) + 2 (|N2(Gs, i)| − |N1(Gs, i)|)
= d(Gs, i) + 2 (|N2(Gs, i)| − d(Gs, i)− 1) = 2|N2(Gs, i)| − d(Gsi)− 2
= 2n− d(Gs, i)− 2 (16)
The substitution of |N2(i)| for n in the last line is a requirement of our assumption that
the network Gs has a diameter of 2.
With the cost to an individual agent in a diameter-2 network established in Equa-
tion (16), we can turn our attention to the social cost. Let C(n,m) denote the social
cost of a diameter-2 network G with n nodes and m edges.
C(n,m) =
∑
i∈N
(2n− d(G, i) − 2) = 2n2 − 2n− 2m. (17)
The lemma follows from the fact that Equation (17) depends only on the diameter-2
assumption, the number of nodes, and the number of edges.
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Proof of Proposition 2. From Lemma 2 we know that the social cost of an efficient out-
come for a uniform UBBC instance is given by Equation (15), and from Lemma 13 we
know that the social cost of any diameter-2 network with m edges is given by Equa-
tion (17). A uniform UBBC instance with k edges per agent induces a network with
m = nk edges. Substituting for m and rearranging shows that both Equations (15) and
(17) are equivalent. The requirement that k < (n−1)/2 is a consequence of the fact that
when k ≥ (n − 1)/2, the efficient outcome is the complete graph, which has a diameter
of 1.
Lemma 5. As the number of agents grows toward infinity, the maximal inequality in a
star topology for the UC network formation game with a constant edge cost 1 ≤ α < ∞
is max{2, (1 + α)/2}.
Note that the notation for the following proof of Lemma 5 differs from that used in
the proof sketch given in Section 3.1. This is because the following proof must address
more than just the center- and peripheral-sponsored stars as was done in the sketch.
Proof. Let s be a strategy profile that produces a star topology rooted at agent c.
Suppose that k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1} is the number of edges that c purchases; i.e., |sc| = k.
When k = 0, we get the peripheral-sponsored star, and when k = n − 1, we get the
center-sponsored star. If k < n− 1, then ∃j ∈ N such that cj(s) = 2n− 3 + α, meaning
that j had to purchase the edge {j, c}. Similarly, when k > 0, then ∃i ∈ N such that
ci(s) = 2n− 3, meaning that c covered the cost of the edge {c, i}.
Partition the set of agents N into three sets:
• Nc = {c} is the singleton consisting of the central agent,
• Nb = {i : c ∈ si} ⊆ N \ {c} is the set of agents who built an edge to c, and
• N¬b = {j : j ∈ sc} ⊆ N \ {c} is the set of “free-loading” agents who do not buy an
edge to c.
Note that we have |N¬b| = k and |Nb| = n− k − 1. All agents within a particular part
are cost-equivalent, so the cost to an agent i given the joint strategy profile s is
ci(s) =


n− 1 + αk if i ∈ Nc
2n− 3 + α if i ∈ Nb
2n− 3 if i ∈ N¬b
When k > (n− 2)/α+1, agents in Nc incur the highest cost and agents in N¬b incur
the lowest cost. Therefore, the inequality ratio is (n − 1 + αk)/(2n − 3). This ratio is
maximized when k = n−1 (i.e., in the center-sponsored star), so the maximal inequality
ratio between agents in Nc and N¬b is (α+ 1)(n − 1)/(2n − 3), giving us
lim
n→∞
IR =
1 + α
2
. (18)
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When k < (n − 2)/α, the central agent in Nc incurs the lowest cost while agents in
Nb incur the highest cost. In this case the inequality ratio is (2n− 3 +α)/(n− 1 +αk).
This quantity is maximized when k = 0 (i.e., in the peripheral-sponsored star), so the
maximal inequality ratio between agents in Nc and Nb is simply (2n − 3 + α)/(n − 1),
giving us
lim
n→∞
IR = 2. (19)
Hence, the largest inequality ratio for a star topology is the maximum between
Equations (18) and (19) as n→∞.
Fact 1. A δ-regular graph of diameter two can have at most n = δ2 + 1 nodes.
Proof. This fact follows from the Moore bound (cf. the survey by Miller and Sira´n
[Mv13]). For completeness, we summarize the relevant part of the presentation in [Mv13,
Section 3.1] regarding the Moore bound.
Consider a node v in a δ-regular graph G. Let ni denote the number of nodes at
distance i from v in G. We can bound ni ≤ (δ − 1)ni−1. If G has a diameter D then
nD =
D∑
i=0
ni ≤ 1 + δ + δ(δ − 1) + · · ·+ δ(δ − 1)D
= 1 + δ(1 + (δ − 1) + · · ·+ (δ − 1)D−1)
=
{
1 + δ (δ−1)
D
−1
δ−2 if δ > 2
2D + 1 if δ = 2
Hence, when the diameter is D = 2, there can be at most δ2 + 1 nodes.
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